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Two Excursions into Current U.S. Supreme Court
Opinion-Writing
By: Paul Rothstein, Professor at Georgetown University Law Center
In the last weeks in June, 2015, as the present term of the U.S. Supreme Court drew to a close,
many controversial and important decisions were handed down by the Court. The substance of
the decisions has been written about extensively. Two of the decisions in particular, though,
caught my eye as a teacher of legal techniques, not for the importance of the subject of the
particular decision, but for what they may illustrate in a teachable fashion about at least some
opinion writing. The two cases are Ohio v. Clark (June 18, 2015) interpreting the Confrontation
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and King v. Burwell (June 25, 2015) interpreting a critical
provision of the Affordable Care Act (known as Obamacare, establishing national health care
insurance in the U.S.). In my “excursions” into these opinions here, I am not directly concerned
with the merits or desirability of the decisions.

Story-Telling: the Ohio v. Clark Decision
As lawyers well know, how you tell a story can have dramatic legal results. Clark contains an
interesting example of narrative manipulation.
The question in Clark was whether a 3-year-old child's out of court statement to his pre-school
teacher that defendant (his mother's boyfriend) physically abused him, could be used
consistently with the Confrontation Clause when the child was incompetent to testify and didn't
testify in court. The case has to do with whether the primary purpose of the statement was to
get/provide evidence against the defendant, in which event it would be testimonial and
inadmissible. The argument that it had that purpose hinged on the fact the teacher had a legal
duty to report child abuse. Subsidiary questions had to do with whether the teacher was thus like
law enforcement and police.
Here's the opening line in Justice Alito's opinion for the majority on the Court, which opinion
decided the case against the defendant (as you immediately realize it is going to do when you
read this opening line):
Darius Clark (the defendant) sent his girlfriend hundreds of miles away to engage in
prostitution and agreed to care for her two young children while she was out of town. A
day later, teachers discovered red marks on her 3-year-old son, and the boy identified
Clark as his abuser.
Here's how the defendant's brief put the same technically irrelevant but emotionally persuasive
fact (that the mother was involved in prostitution):
Taheim [the mother] was with L.P [the child] the rest of the afternoon and evening until
she put him to sleep. At around midnight, she [the mother] caught a Greyhound bus to
Washington, D.C. to engage in prostitution. Because Taheim knew that her
[own] mother and aunt disapproved of what she was doing, she left

L.P. and A.T. [the child and his sister] at her house under Clark's [the defendant's] care.
The children knew Clark well and neither Taheim nor anyone else had ever seen him do
anything violent.
You will note that the circumstance that the mother took a trip for prostitution is irrelevant and
has nothing to do with the technical analysis involved in deciding the case, yet that information
was included by both sides of the case. But each side had a way of telling exactly the same
circumstance in a way that pre-disposes the reader or listener in their favor.
Comparing the two quotes above makes that evident. The first quote makes defendant look like
a bad character. The second quote, combined with some other stuff about the mother, was part
of a plan to make it more likely the mother was the one who beat the child-- which was indeed a
realistic possibility because there was evidence she had beat him and her children before. The
Supreme Court doesn't mention any of this nor even hint at any notion that the mother may have
done the beating that defendant was charged with. Nor does the Court note just how shaky,
uncertain, hesitant, reluctant, and unclear the child's statement identifying the defendant was,
nor how he had to be pressed to make the identification. Nor did the Court mention that the
child may have been aware that another sibling had been removed by social services from the
mother's custody and that the present child may have wished not to be similarly removed,
influencing the child to I.D. the defendant rather than the mother. It is even possible the child
may have been coached by the mother regarding what to say if questioned about the injuries.
When one starts reading the Alito opinion, and sees the opening line of the opinion (i.e., the first
quotation reproduced above), one says to oneself, "Why on earth would Justice Alito set forth
this essentially irrelevant information?” More especially, “Why would he do it in the very first
sentence of the opinion?"
There is a ready answer. It is immediately apparent from that opening line that Alito is going to
decide against the defendant. He probably wanted to justify the result on an emotional as well as
legal level.
Justice Alito in that opening line seems to want to evoke in the reader the cultural "Male Pimp"
stereotype (putting the defendant at a disadvantage); whereas the defendant, in the excerpt from
his brief reproduced above (the second quotation reproduced above), may want to evoke the
"Female Prostitute" cultural stereotype (which suggests maybe the mother/"prostitute" beat the
kid rather than the defendant). Thus Alito's opening line makes it look like the
defendant sent his "girlfriend" to commit prostitution, whereas the way the defendant's brief
puts the same information makes it look like the prostitution was all her idea.
I conclude that Justice Alito (and/or perhaps those other justices for whom he was writing) may
have believed it necessary to open the opinion this way because he was (they were) a bit
sensitive about the inadequacy of the decision/opinion itself. Perhaps he (they) feared that the
reader (and maybe even Alito and his fellow justices themselves) would feel queasy about the
opinion's result, i.e. about putting the defendant in jail for a substantial portion of his life based
on such slim shaky equivocal evidence as this three-year-old's practically unintelligible, nearly
coerced, totally unclear, unconfronted, unexamined statement, where the child's demeanor was
not displayed to the jury—especially since it seems the mother may well have been the real

culprit and the child may have been coached and/or influenced by fear of being removed from
her.
To the extent Alito can make us (and perhaps himself and his fellow justices) see the defendant
as a pimp, we (and they) don't feel so bad about putting the defendant away.

A Single Word (and Politics?) May Make a Difference: The
King v. Burwell Decision (Obamacare)
How is it that the U.S. Supreme Court—including normally conservative Chief Justice John
Roberts—upheld the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare)? Seems counterintuitive. The politics
seems against it: A majority of the Court are conservative Republicans. The law seems against
it: The critical provision of the act seems clearly to disallow certain subsidies crucial to
Obamacare.
But, in politics and law, nothing is quite as it seems. Both politics and law in fact militated in
favor of upholding Obamacare.

The Opinion in King v. Burwell Made Sense Politically
Quite counter-intuitively, Republicans would have been in a bind had Obamacare been struck
down. They would have been deprived of a “cause” (“Repeal Obamacare!”) which they hope
will be a rallying cry to help them win the next election. And they would have had to explain
depriving millions of people of health care and depriving the public of some very popular
provisions, such as portability and the pre-existing conditions ban. The onus would have been
on Republicans to come up with a plan of their own.
Further, Chief Justice Roberts has been openly concerned that the Court was getting a political
image after Bush v. Gore (in the year 2000) which gave the presidential election to George W.
Bush. Is Roberts in the process of trying to correct the impression that the Court is getting
polarized along political lines? He voted for Obamacare earlier as well, and has surprised us
with a few other recent judicial votes leaning more liberal.
In Burwell was Roberts setting us up for an imminent opinion by him going the other way
(politically speaking)? Was he engaged in some kind of advance attempt to balance the books?
A Supreme Court decision according a nationwide right of same sexes to marry did come down
very shortly after Burwell and Roberts did indeed file a dissenting opinion.
Or maybe in Burwell (the Obamacare decision) Roberts and Kennedy (the two deciding votes
that had been in doubt) were merely concerned about being on the wrong side of history. Did
they have a conscience about depriving millions of people of health care? When the law can be
read either way (as usually is so when something reaches the Supreme Court) this kind of thing
often influences the decision.
In each of the two decisions Justice Roberts has written for the Court upholding the Obamacare
plan—a plan conservatives excoriate—he does so in a way that throws a very significant bone
to conservatives—a bone that is likely to be more important to them in the long run than the

particular ruling. In each opinion he upholds Obamacare by resort to a doctrine more limiting of
governmental power than the straightforward doctrine liberals had advocated for upholding it.
Thus, in the earlier of the two decisions, he sustained Obamacare's mandate to individuals to
buy insurance, by resorting to Congress's constitutional power to tax, rather than Congress's
constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce, the broader power more favored by
liberals. In the present case, Burwell, he sustains Obamacare subsidies by close statutory
interpretation rather than by deference to the administering agency's interpretation as many
liberals had urged. In each decision he rejects the more government-empowering doctrine in
language that severely restricts its applicability for the future.
It should also be noted that upholding Obamacare, as the Court and Roberts did, promotes a
more conservative model of according nationwide social benefits than liberals usually press for.
Obamacare, by utilizing private insurance companies in the financing of health care, accords
social benefits through a privatized, rather than wholly governmental, mechanism. This
privatized model is likely to be preferred by conservatives regarding, for example, inevitable
future reforms of social security, among other things.

The Opinion in King v. Burwell Made Sense Legally
Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts holds in Burwell that the single, small word “such”
(that appears in the Act) substantially rescues Obamacare. This again is quite counter-intuitive.
But it makes sense. It was critical to parsing the legal text and instrumental in the result.
The question in the case was whether there could be subsidies to the millions of poor people
who bought their health insurance on federal exchanges that were established by the federal
government for those very numerous states that refused (for political or other reasons) to set up
their own exchanges. The letter of the law provided only for subsidies if insurance was bought
on state-established exchanges.
But if subsidies were so limited, Obamacare would probably financially implode. Roberts saves
the day for Obamacare by holding that the phrase “such exchanges” (appearing in the Act
arguably in connection with the subsidies) made it ambiguous what exchanges could carry the
subsidies. In other words, when the federal government set up exchanges for states, those
exchanges might be included as state exchanges.
If a law is ambiguous, Roberts is then entitled to invoke, as he did, the well known axiom of
statutory construction that the overall purpose of Congress in enacting the scheme under
consideration should prevail. Here, that purpose was to have a viable national healthcare plan.
Without the subsidies in those states that did not set up their own exchanges, the future of
Obamacare’s overall mission would be gravely in doubt.

Who is the Dreaded “Judicial Activist”?
A final conundrum in Burwell is worth noting.
An oft-repeated rubric in the United States is that Congress, consisting of the people’s
representatives, writes the laws, whereas judges (who are usually unelected) merely apply them.

There is an ongoing battle over when the courts may be regarded as transgressing that line
between the institutions. When people feel a judge has overstepped, they call the judge a
“judicial activist.” But in reality, the line is often blurry and the charge of judicial activism tends
to be made by individuals against any judge whose opinions the individual doesn’t like.
In his dissent in Burwell Justice Scalia accuses the majority in the case (including Chief Justice
Roberts) of judicial activism—of re-writing the law to uphold Obamacare. Scalia scathingly
concludes that Obamacare should now be called “SCOTUScare” ("SCOTUS" being a wellknown acronym for “the Supreme Court of the U.S.”) because the Supreme Court (and Roberts)
have twice re-characterized provisions to foster the health care scheme.
Chief Justice Roberts, on the other hand, sees Justice Scalia’s dissent as the activist view:
Roberts declares that he (Roberts) does not want to be a judicial activist by overturning
Congress’s intention in enacting Obamacare. He accuses Scalia of voting to do just that.

Conclusion
Perhaps one overall message from the two current cases treated in this piece, aside from their
merits, is that there is always more going on than meets the eye. And I have only scratched the
surface.

